

The Palestinians are mainly to blame for the failure of the Peace Process

Yes

- 1. The Peace Process has failed because of Yasser Arafat's intransigence. At the Camp David summit in 2000 Israeli PM Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians control of more than 80% of the West Bank and all of Gaza, but still Yasser Arafat refused to make peace. He was the last leader to have the authority to be able to sell a peace deal and the necessary concessions to the Palestinians
- 2. Peace process has failed because Israel has no partner for peace after the split between Fatah (West Bank) and Hamas (Gaza) in 2006. Mahmoud Abbas who succeeded Arafat is too weak to make a peace. He personally lacks democratic legitimacy since there have been no new elections for President since 2006, and the Palestinian Authority, which runs local services in the West Bank has, through corruption and cronyism, lost the respect of many ordinary Palestinians.
- 3. The Peace Process has failed because Palestinian society as a whole has been unwilling to accept the realities of its losses. Even though it's over fifty years since their defeat in 1967, and over seventy years since their defeat in 1948, many Palestinians, both young and old, believe that Israel is only a temporary phenomenon and that if they show 'sumud' i.e steadfastness, time is on their side and eventually they can have the whole land back.
- 4. The Peace Process has failed because Palestinians have never fully given up the use of violence to achieve their goals. The First Intifada In 1987-88 and the Second Intifada in 2000-2005 were suppressed, but the electoral victory of Hamas a radical Islamic terror group committed to the destruction of Israel in 2006 elections in both the West Bank and Gaza, showed a continuing support of armed resistance. After Hamas seized control of Gaza, there have been frequent rocket attacks on Israel and this has caused Israeli voters to chose leaders who prioritise security over peace.
- 5. The Peace Process has failed because the Palestinian leadership has been unable to keep the support of the major neighboring Arab powers, Egypt and Jordan. In Gaza, the ruling party Hamas, alienated the traditional military elite which controls Egypt by allying with their deadly rivals, the Muslim Brotherhood who briefly held power in Egypt in 2012. On the West Bank, the relationship between Fatah and Jordanian Government has always been strained by the presence in Jordan of over two million Palestinian refugees whose hostility to Israel causes political and security problems for the fragile Jordanian monarchy.


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PARALLEL HICTORIES

Poster produced by the Palestinian armed group Al-Asifah in 1993. Translation: 'The sixth anniversary of the launching of the Palestinian popular intifada: 1987-1993 Death to traitors: Our people reject the Oslo Accords



Source: Palestine Poster Archive





Amnesty: Hamas rocket attacks amounted to war crimes

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Rocket and mortar attacks by Palestinian militant groups during last summer's conflict in Gaza amounted to war crimes, Amnesty International says.

Militants displayed a "flagrant disregard" for the lives of civilians during the 50-day war, a report found.

Six civilians in Israel and 13 Palestinians are believed to have been killed as a result of such attacks.

Hamas, which dominates Gaza, said Amnesty's report contained many inaccuracies and false allegations.

Israel and the Palestinians

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Israel-Palestinian tensions return to boiling point



Article in The Guardian

Palestinian territories

Thu 23 May 2002 02.25 BST





Benny Morris



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Arafat didn't negotiate - he just kept saying no

Ever since the start of the second Palestinian intifada, a row has raged over who was responsible for the breakdown of the peace process. Now, for the first time, former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak has weighed in, accusing Yasser Arafat of being a liar who talked peace while secretly plotting the destruction of Israel. Interview by Benny Morris

The call from Bill Clinton came hours after the publication in the New York Times of a "revisionist" article on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On holiday, Ehud Barak, Israel's former prime minister, was swimming in a cove in Sardinia. According to Barak, Clinton said: "What the hell is this? Why is she turning the mistakes we [ie, the US and Israel] made into the essence? The true story of Camp David was that for the first time in the history of the conflict the American president put on the table a proposal, based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, very close to the Palestinian demands, and Arafat refused even to accept it as a basis for negotiations, walked out of the room, and deliberately turned to terrorism."

linton was speaking of the two-week-long Camp David conference in July 2000 which he had organised and mediated and its failure, and the eruption at the end of September of the Palestinian intifada which has continued since. Halfway through the conference, apparently on July 18, Clinton had "slowly" - to avoid misunderstanding read out to Arafat a document, endorsed in advance by Barak, outlining the main points of a future settlement. The proposals included the establishment of a demilitarised Palestinian state on some 92% of the West Bank and 100% of the Gaza Strip, with some territorial compensation for the Palestinians from pre-1967 Israeli territory; the dismantling of most of the settlements and the concentration of the bulk of the settlers inside the 8% of the West Bank to be annexed by Israel; the establishment of the Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem, in which some Arab neighborhoods would become sovereign Palestinian territory and others would enjoy "functional autonomy"; Palestinian sovereignty over half the Old City of Jerusalem (the Muslim and Christian quarters) and "custodianship," though not sovereignty, over the Temple Mount; a return of refugees to the prospective Palestinian state though with no "right of return" to Israel proper; and the organisation by the international community of a massive aid programme to facilitate the refugees' rehabilitation.

Arafat said no. Enraged, Clinton banged on the table and said: "You are leading your people and the region to a catastrophe." A formal Palestinian rejection of the proposals reached the Americans the next day. The summit sputtered on for a few days more but to all intents and purposes it was over.









NEOPATRIMONIALISM, CORRUPTION, AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: PATHWAYS TO REAL REFORM

By Marwa Fatafta

Overview

Palestinians recently ranked corruption as the second largest problem they face after the economic crisis – higher than the Israeli occupation, which ranked third. Indeed, Palestinians generally view Palestinian Authority (PA) officials as a self-serving, elitist group disconnected from the Palestinian national struggle and the daily sufferings of the people. Such perceptions are fostered by the failure of the Oslo Accords, the death of the Palestinian statehood project, and the continued fragmentation of political leadership in the context of Israel's ongoing oppressive occupation and its violations of Palestinians' fundamental rights.

Despite this dissatisfaction, there has been little change in the last two decades, whether at the top leadership level or within the ranks of PA institutions. What remains a constant are the "old guards" maintaining a tight grip on power, rampant and systemic corruption, and the alienation of Palestinians from participation in decisions that impact their lives and future.

The present reality of the PA in no way resembles the kind of Palestinian government promised since the heady years of the Oslo Accords. As Nathan Brown observed, "Palestine is, in short, a model liberal democracy. Its most significant flaw is that it does not exist." This discrepancy between envisaged democratic leadership and reality can be explained by the neopatrimonial nature of the Palestinian political system. Neopatrimonialism is a hybrid model in which state structures, laws, and regulations are formally in place but overridden by informal politics and networks of patronage, kinship, and tribalism. Instead of being organized according to merit, public function, or administrative grades, a neopatrimonial regime finds its glue in bonds of loyalty to those at the top of the political hierarchy.





Hamas security forces next to an Egyptian watch tower on the border between Egypt and Gaza, in Rafah, southerr Gaza Strip, September 21, 2015

Egypt's relations with Hamas have always been turbulent. Hamas was formed in 1987 as a Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Egypt considers the Brotherhood a terrorist group. But Egypt shares a border by Gaza, which Hamas governs, and the country often has served as an intermediary between Israel and Hamas when fighting breaks out.

Egypt moved aggressively against hundreds of Hamas smuggling tunnels after the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government of Mohamed Morsi was ousted in 2013. It closed its Rafah border crossing into Gaza except for humanitarian supplies, citing security threats. Israel has closed its Gaza border in an attempt to stem the flow of weapons and supplies used to make them from reaching Hamas.

Op Ed from Jerusalem Online Mark 2018

Egypt also revoked the Egyptian citizenship of some Hamas leaders, including cofounder Mahmoud Al Zahar.

Egypt also is wary of Hamas's close ties to Iran, which pours money and weapons into Gaza. Iran expects Hamas to use that support to attack Israel, while Egypt is hoping to keep the area quiet. Last month, Egypt reportedly made Hamas choose between Iran or Palestinian reconciliation.








Palestinian refugee Ibrahim Abu Mustaf, 83, who says is a former inhabitant of the town of Beersheva, carries the key to his former home as he sits next to a child outside his home in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the southern Gaza Strip on May 15, 2016. (AFP PHOTO / SAID KHATIB)

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Palestinians on Sunday marked the anniversary of their "Nakba" ("Catastrophe") — namely the dispossession that accompanied the creation of the State of Israel almost seven decades ago — with sirens and low-key marches.



Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website March 2019





Abbas vows to continue stipends to terrorists even with PA's 'last penny' | The Times of Israel

Abbas vows to continue stipends to terrorists even with PA's 'last penny'

Palestinian leader says 'prisoners and martyrs are stars in the skies of the Palestinian struggle, and they have priority in everything'

By **TOI STAFF** 24 July 2018, 12:25 am



Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said Monday the PA will continue to pay stipends to the families of Palestinian security prisoners and slain terrorists even if it has to spend its last penny to do so.

"We will not accept a cut or cancellation of salaries to the families of martyrs and prisoners, as some are trying to bring about," he told representatives of a Palestinian prisoners advocacy group.

Israel has called on Palestinians for years to halt the stipends, which benefit roughly 35,000 families of Palestinians killed, wounded, or jailed in the conflict with Israel, many of them accused of involvement in terror. Israel says the stipends encourage violence.

 $Earlier this month, the \ Knesset \ passed \ a \ law \ to cut funds \ Israel \ transfers \ to \ the \ PA \ respective \ to \ the \ amount \ Ramallah \ pays \ to \ convicted \ terrorists \ and \ the \ families \ of \ Palestinians \ killed \ during \ attacks.$

But Abbas has remained defiant.

"Even if we have only a penny left, we will give it to the martyrs, the prisoners and their families," he said Monday.

 $\hbox{``We view the prisoners and the martyrs as planets and stars in the skies of the Palestinian struggle, and they have}\\$

priority in everything."

 $He also \ voiced \ praise for the \ prisoners' \ movement, saying \ it \ was \ "paving \ the \ way for \ the \ independence \ of \ Palestine."$



Top Fatah official Jibril Rajoub in the West Bank city of Ramallah, June 6, 2018

At the same meeting senior Fatah official Jibril Rajoub, a former head of Palestinian Preventive Security forces in the West Bank, lauded Abbas for his steadfast stance.

"You are under great pressure not to put the issue of martyrs and prisoners in your priorities," he said, "but your determination to consider their cause as your top issue reflects the extent to which the suffering of prisoners weighs upon your mind."

Immediately after the new Israeli law was passed at the beginning of the month, Abbas said the PA "will not allow

anyone to interfere with the money that Israel is against us paying to the families of martyrs and prisoners."

The Palestinians contend the number of stipend recipients involved in deadly attacks is a small fraction of those aided by the fund. They say that the tax revenue collected by Israel for them under past peace agreements is their money and that the PA has a responsibility to all of its citizens like any other government.

The stipends amount to approximately \$330 million, or about 7 percent of the Palestinian Authority's \$5 billion budget in 2018.

FACEBOOK







MARWAN MUASHER

The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship has always been driven by two major factors: that a considerable number of Jordanians are of Palestinian origin and that all Jordanians—East Bankers and those of Palestinian origin alike—fear that a solution to the Palestinians' predicament might come at Jordan's expense.

This explains why Jordan has always treated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a domestic affair and why it has been a strong advocate of the two-state solution that would lead to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. More than six decades after most Palestinian refugees arrived in Jordan and were granted Jordanian citizenship, the question of who is a Jordanian is still not settled in Jordanian laws and political culture. That's because the political establishment fears that a hard-line Israeli government might one day declare that a Palestinian state already exists—in Jordan.

Current realities present Jordan with serious challenges. The two-state solution appears to be dead. Both Israeli right-wing parties and individuals have been calling for some time for Jordanian control over parts of the West Bank that they do not wish Israel to keep. This essentially promotes a solution that serves Israeli interests but is detrimental to those of the Palestinians and denies them any control over East Jerusalem. The current Israeli government has repeatedly expressed its lack of interest in a two-state solution, and the Palestinian leadership is too weak and divided to push that solution forward.



Problem	W.B	GS	Total
Economic crisis	32.2%	25.0%	29.6%
Corruption	31.8%	17.2%	26.5%
Israeli Occupation Policies	18.3%	16.6%	17.7%
The continued Internal division	9.9%	25.6%	15.6%
Failure to complete the Legal & institutional structure	3.3%	9.8%	5.6%
Lack of infrastructure development	4.6%	5.7%	5.0%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: AMAN Coalition, the 2017 Opinion poll "Opinion of Palestinians on the State of Corruption and combating it, in Palestine.



The Palestinians are mainly to blame for the failure of the Peace Process

NO

- 1. The Peace Process has failed because no Israeli Government since Rabin's ever wanted it to succeed. Israel has sabotaged the Oslo Accords by its policy of illegal Jewish settlement in areas designated for a future Palestinian state. The number of Jewish settlers has gone from a quarter of a million when the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993, to three-quarters of a million in 2019 and every single Israeli Government has been complicit in this policy.
- 2. The Peace Process has failed because Israel prefers the status quo to having to face up to the painful strategic choices which confront it. Israelis can't decide if they want to a) give up the West Bank and Gaza and remain a Jewish and democratic state, b) annex the West Bank and Gaza, give all citizens equal political rights and so cease to be a majority Jewish state, or c) annex West Bank and Gaza without offering the all citizens same political rights and so cease to be a democracy. The so-called Peace Process has simply allowed them to 'kick the can down the road'.
- 3. The Peace Process has failed because the imbalance of power between the two sides has meant that Israel can to a large extent insulate itself from the plight of the Palestinians. Security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has made the cost of occupation manageable, both in terms of money and lost Israeli lives, and Gaza is easily kept under siege. Israel has control without responsibility. Furthermore, the international community shoulders the cost of propping up the Palestinian Authority.
- 4. The Peace Process has failed because since Oslo, both through immigration from the former Soviet Union and the high birth rate among ultra-Orthodox Jews, the Israeli population has become increasingly nationalistic and religious. There has been no democratic mandate for any Israeli government to make the concessions necessary to achieve peace e.g. on the status of East Jerusalem, control of the Jordan valley, Palestinian right of return, or the removal of settlements.
- 5. The Peace Process has failed because of the unhelpful interference of the US government. American politicians, famously scared of the pro-Israel lobby in the US, have been incapable of neutrality, and the US has consistently protected Israel from censure at the UN. Successive US administrations have provided Israel with the fig leaf of a meaningless peace process to cover the creeping annexation of Palestinian territory in the West Bank.



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Netanyahu Says Will Begin Annexing West Bank if He Wins Israel Election

Netanyahu tells Channel 12 three days before election that he will not 'evacuate any community' nor divide Jerusalem: 'A Palestinian state will endanger our existence'

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Netanyahu 2019: Radicalized by Obama, Unleashed by Trump



Extremely Jewish & Incredibly Unified: Libertarianism, Messianism and the Battle Over the Israeli Right



How Benny Gantz Can Win the Vote but Still Lose the Israeli Election to Netanyahu



Tears and Loathing in 'Israel's Ohio' as Election Day Nears






1994 Cartoon in <u>The Guardian</u>








The percentage of Israeli 18- to 34-year-olds who self-identify as right wing is consistently higher than the percentage of the general electorate, according to the survey. (Laura E. Adkins/JTA)





VISUALIZINGPALESTINE ATDA



16/5/2017 Article in The Guardian

Israel-Palestine: the real reason there's still no peace

The possibility of a lasting deal seems as far away as ever - and the history of failed negotiations suggests it's largely because Israel prefers the status quo

by Nathan Thrall

It was, is, and will remain irrational for Israel to absorb the costs of an agreement when the price of the alternative is so comparatively low. The consequences of choosing impasse are hardly threatening: mutual recriminations over the cause of stalemate, new rounds of talks, and retaining control of all of the West Bank from within and much of Gaza from without. Meanwhile, Israel continues to receive more US military aid per year than goes to all the world's other nations combined, and presides over a growing economy, rising standards of living and a population that reports one of the world's highest levels of subjective wellbeing. Israel will go on absorbing the annoying but sofar tolerable costs of complaints about settlement policies. And it will likely witness several more countries bestowing the State of Palestine with symbolic recognition, a few more negative votes in impotent university student councils, limited calls for boycotts of settlement goods, and occasional bursts of violence that the greatly

overpowered Palestinians are too weak to sustain. There is no contest.

he real explanation for the past decades of failed peace negotiations is not mistaken tactics or imperfect circumstances, but that no strategy can succeed if it is premised on Israel behaving irrationally. Most arguments put to Israel for agreeing to a partition are that it is preferable to an imagined, frightening future in which the country ceases to be either a Jewish state or a democracy, or both. Israel is constantly warned that if it does not soon decide to grant Palestinians citizenship or sovereignty, it will become, at some never-defined future date, an apartheid state. But these assertions contain the implicit acknowledgment that it makes no sense for Israel to strike a deal today rather than wait to see if such imagined threats actually materialise. If and when they do come to be, Israel can then make a deal. Perhaps in the interim, the hardship of Palestinian life will cause enough emigration that Israel may annex the West Bank without giving up the state's Jewish majority. Or, perhaps, the West Bank will be absorbed by Jordan, and Gaza by Egypt, a better outcome than Palestinian statehood, in the view of many Israeli officials.

It is hard to argue that forestalling an agreement in the present makes a worse deal more likely in the future: the international community and the PLO have already established the ceiling of their demands - 22% of the land now under Israeli control - while providing far less clarity about the floor, which Israel can try to lower. Israel has continued to reject the same Palestinian claims made since the 1980s, albeit with a few added Palestinian concessions. In fact, history suggests that a strategy of waiting would serve the country well: from the British government's 1937 Peel Commission partition plan and the UN partition plan of 1947 to UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the Oslo accords, every formative initiative endorsed by the great powers has given more to the Jewish community in Palestine than the previous one. Even if an Israeli prime minister knew that one day the world's nations would impose sanctions on Israel if it did not accept a two-state agreement, it would still be irrational to strike such a deal now. Israel could instead wait until that day comes, and thereby enjoy many more years of West Bank control and the security advantages that go with it - particularly valuable at a time of cataclysm in the region.





2016 Tel Aviv summer street party: the annual 'Water War'

Source: Ynet News



BOOKS

SHOT IN THE HEART

When Yitzhak Rabin was killed, did the prospects for peace perish, too?

By Dexter Filkins October 19, 2015

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A portrait of Rabin at the November 12, 1995, memorial ceremonies in $Tel\ Aviv$. Photograph by A. Abbas / Magnum

A ssassination is an unpredictable act. Historically speaking, high-profile political killings have been as likely to produce backlashes and unintended consequences as they have been to achieve the assassin's goal, if he had one. When Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy, the result was an outpouring of national soul-searching, which Lyndon Johnson took advantage of to push civil-rights and Great Society legislation through Congress. When Syrians conspired to murder Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese President, in 2005, the result was not continued Syrian domination of Lebanon but a national uprising followed

extract from The New Yorker 2015

Yet the killing of Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister, in 1995, by Yigal Amir, an Israeli extremist, bids to be one of history's most effective political murders. Two years earlier, Rabin, setting aside a lifetime of enmity, appeared on the White House lawn with Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization and a former terrorist, to agree to a framework for limited Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories; the next year, somewhat less painfully, he returned to the White House, with Jordan's King Hussein, to officially end a forty-six-year state of war. Within months of Rabin's death, Benjamin Netanyahu was the new Prime Minister and the prospects for a widerranging peace in the Middle East, which had seemed in Rabin's grasp, were dead, too. Twenty years later, Netanyahu is into his fourth term, and the kind of peace that Rabin envisaged seems more distant than ever.


The story of Rabin's assassination, told in "Killing a King" (Norton), by the journalist Dan Ephron, inevitably raises the question of what might have been. At the time of his death, Rabin showed every intention of trying to forge a broader peace that would have included ceding most of the occupied territories to the Palestinians, and probably would have resulted in the establishment of an independent state.



Shas

The Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party and its lawmakers made history in 1993 when they abstained in the vote on the Oslo Accords, ensuring its approval. The party's leader then and now, Arye Dery, has since spoken against the Oslo peace process.


Shas voters:



Where Shas voters stand on possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


Source: Haaretz







What the P5 has used its veto for the most



The USA uses its veto to protect Israel from criticism

Source: UN Security Council