


Were the Israelis justified in the use of force in the First Intifada?

Lines of Argument for YES

1. Israel as a result of the Six Days' War had responsibility for maintaining law and order inside the West Bank and Gaza, and given the overwhelming power of the IDF, it was irresponsible of the Palestinians to launch an uprising which had no chance of succeeding and which would lead to unnecessary deaths on both sides
2. Some of the First Intifada was organised by Islamist groups inspired by the revolution in Iran. These groups were completely hostile to Israel's existence and were not open to peaceful negotiation
3. Israel was only defending itself against an unfair attack – unfair because many of the Palestinian problems were caused either by their own leaders or the leaders of neighbouring Arab states
4. In general Israeli rule was good for Palestinians; they were much better off after 1967 than before in terms of access to education and even things like electricity under Israel's policy of enlightened occupation. These gains would have been lost if Israel had lost control
5. The use of Israeli force was successful as the Intifada became more unpopular among Palestinians and eventually they realised that if they wanted to improve their condition, they had to talk to the Israelis rather than attack them.



Jordanian and Egyptian attacks on Israel in 1967: map from the Jewish Virtual Library



According to the IDF spokesperson, 942 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians on suspicion of collaboration between 9 December 1987 and 30 November 1993. The Associated Press put the total at 771.⁵³

Quote from S.Catignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army*, p.84

MYTH

From the Jewish Virtual Library's entry on Palestinian uprisings

"Israel closed West Bank schools during the intifada to deprive Palestinians of an education."

FACT

Educational opportunities in the territories greatly improved under Israeli rule. The number of elementary and secondary schools increased by more than a third from 1967-88. Women were major beneficiaries of the boom. From 1970-86, for example, the percentage of women who had not attended school was slashed by more than half, from 67 percent to 32 percent. Before 1967, no universities existed on the West Bank; six were built under Israel's administration.

Despite the intifada, nursery schools, kindergartens and most West Bank vocational schools remained open because none were used to instigate violence. Gaza schools also stayed open because militant Islamic fundamentalists there used the mosques, not schools, to incite their followers.

The [PLO](#) used many schools, however, to stimulate attacks against Israelis. Caches of knives, clubs and iron bars were found hidden in school buildings. "Schools are the natural place for a demonstration to begin," wrote Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab. "In school, demonstrations and stone-throwing are part of a tradition....To hit an Israeli car is to become a hero."¹⁶

In 1988, Israel closed some secondary schools and colleges in the West Bank that were being used to orchestrate the insurrection. After it announced the closures, Israel offered to reopen any school whose principal would guarantee that his school would be used to educate children, not to encourage rioting. But educators, many cowed by the uprising leadership, remained silent. When the violence subsided, Israel reopened all high schools, colleges and universities.

Interestingly, when the U.S.-led coalition attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, the [Palestinian Authority](#) reacted to violent protests by Palestinians in the [Gaza Strip](#) by closing universities and schools there.¹⁷

Entry in the Jewish Virtual Library on education and school closures in the West Bank during the First Intifada

Year	Private consumption		Disposable private income		Total gross domestic investment	
	WB	Gaza	WB	Gaza	WB	Gaza
1968	522	203	575	243	34	25
1969	624	241	691	278	89	49
1970	698	283	778	368	59	47
1971	774	304	927	403	91	58
1972	926	376	1174	514	166	101
1973	959	396	1075	579	143	115
1974	1042	434	1299	586	297	122
1975	1118	486	1289	611	212	139
1976	1228	486	1431	678	278	160
1977	1234	563	1382	702	278	161
1978	1267	562	1662	766	381	176
1979	1358	563	1614	850	340	197
1980	1371	556	1705	795	535	174
1981	1433	564	1642	873	351	192
1982	1485	581	1874	876	450	177
1983	1488	655	1776	946	405	180
1984	1521	685	1767	898	394	172
1985	1501	702	1711	797	440	164
1986	1767	776	2243	944	578	184
1987	1895	833	2293	1093	497	201

Israeli Ministry of Finance report on economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza between the Six Day War and the First Intifada

1. The Camp David Partners—Reconfirmation of the Commitment to Peace.

Ten years ago, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was concluded on the basis of the Camp David Accords. When the accords were signed, it was expected that more Arab countries would shortly join the circle of peace. This expectation was not realized.

2. The Arab Countries—From a State of War to a Process of Peace

The prime minister urged the U.S. and Egypt to call on the other Arab countries to desist from hostility towards Israel and to replace belligerency and boycott with negotiation and cooperation. Of all the Arab countries, only Egypt has recognized Israel and its right to exist. Many of these states actively participated in wars against Israel by direct involvement or indirect assistance. To this day, the Arab countries are partners in an economic boycott against Israel, refuse to recognize it and refuse to establish diplomatic relations with it.

3. A Solution to the Refugee Problem—An International Effort

The prime minister has called for an international effort, led by the U.S., and with the significant participation of Israel, to solve the problem of the Arab refugees. The refugee problem has been perpetuated by the leaders of the Arab countries, while Israel with its meagre resources is absorbing hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab countries. Settling the refugees must not wait for a political process or come in its stead.

4. Free Elections in Judea, Samaria and Gaza on the Road to Negotiations.

In order to bring about a process of political negotiations and in order to locate legitimate representatives of the Palestinian population, the prime minister proposes that free elections be held among the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza—elections that will be free of the intimidation and terror of the PLO.

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
An Analysis of the Current Revolt

By Hanna Siniora editor of al-Fajr newspaper, East Jerusalem.

The current uprising in the occupied territories is the result of the coincidence of a number of factors, primary among them the cumulative effects of the occupation. We are now in the twenty-first year of this occupation which has been characterised by a range of human rights violations: deportations, administrative detentions, town restrictions, lack of freedom of expression, censorship of the press, not to mention land confiscation, high taxation, imprisonment, and various forms of humiliation.

It is the assertive, confident generation of 1967 that has just come of age that is rebelling. It fears neither the Israeli occupation nor the fact that live ammunition is being used. And each time the Israelis arrest some of the leaders, twice the number arrested steps in to assume leadership roles. This generation believes strongly in a secular state and a secular ideology, although the voice of the fundamentalists is present. And although the uprising is primarily the product of work begun by the younger generation, it is clear today that young and old of all factions have joined in.

Prior to the uprising it seemed that Israel, the Arab countries, and the international community had succeeded in shelving the Palestinian issue for probably two or three years. There was no movement; the Palestinian issue appeared to be in suspended animation. Now the situation is different. We have succeeded in changing the status quo and in calling into question the viability of the occupation.

[...]

Another factor that should be taken into consideration is that in the Arab summit meeting held in Amman in November 1987 the Arab heads of state-while congregating only half an hour away from Jerusalem-for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle down-graded the Palestinian issue. The attention of the Arab countries was focused elsewhere, on the Gulf war, and therefore, the Palestinian issue was put on the back burner. This both angered the Palestinians and created tension among them, particularly those living under occupation.

Another important event, which came on the heels of the Amman summit, was the Washington meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. There, too, the Palestinian issue was ignored. It may have been discussed at a lower level at the State Department, but it was not discussed between Reagan and Gorbachev. The Palestinians, therefore, felt that the Arab world and the international community were ignoring the Palestinian issue. Thus, the uprising was to a large extent the result of the cumulative effects of twenty years of occupation, the position of the Israeli government, and the lack of interest on the part of the Arab countries and the international community.

Hannah Siniora, 'An Analysis of the Current Revolt,' *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring, 1988)

On the Destruction of Israel:

'Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.' (Preamble)

The Exclusive Moslem Nature of the Area:

'The land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf [Holy Possession] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day. No one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part of it.'
(Article 11)

'Palestine is an Islamic land... Since this is the case, the Liberation of Palestine is an individual duty for every Moslem

The Covenant of the Hamas 1988 – main points, published on webpage for Israel's Foreign Ministry

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Harm to palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel

01 January 2011

Share:   

Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, Palestinians have killed dozens of Palestinian civilians on suspicion of collaboration with Israel. Some of the victims were killed in assassinations conducted by organizations; others died at the hands of Palestinian Authority security forces as a result of being tortured or when attempting to escape, while other were lynched by crowds of people. Also, the Palestinian Authority killed several Palestinians whom the State Security Court, in a patently unfair judicial process, had convicted of collaborating with Israel.

This phenomenon is not new. During the first intifada, hundreds of Palestinians were killed by their fellow Palestinians for allegedly collaborating with Israel. The definition of "collaboration" was much broader then, and included, for example, directly assisting Israeli security forces by gathering information and trapping wanted persons, serving on Israel's behalf in political positions in local authorities, the Civil Administration, and the Israel Police Force, brokering and selling land to Israeli organizations, failing to participate in work strikes, marketing banned Israeli merchandise. Also, collaboration included actions defined as "immoral", even if not directly related to assisting the Israeli authorities. Prostitution and drug dealing came within this category. In the current intifada, individuals who maintain contacts with Israel's security services are deemed collaborators.

In many cases, the attacks against suspected collaborators were particularly brutal. Some suspects were abducted, tortured, killed and then had their bodies mutilated and placed on public display.

These acts against collaborators, particularly the killing of suspects, are patently illegal and immoral. They constitute grave breaches of the Four Geneva Conventions, and the International Criminal Court Statute defines these acts as war crimes. Every state, organization and individual, even those that are not formal parties to these international agreements, are subject to its rules and principles.

International law also provides that a person may be punished only after being charged and convicted of a recognized criminal offense. In addition, defendants are entitled to due process and the opportunity to properly defend themselves.

More on Inter-Palestinian
violations

Severe human rights violations in intra-Palestinian clashes

Harm to Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel

Death Penalty in the Palestinian Authority

Statistics on the death penalty in the Palestinian Authority and under Hamas control in Gaza

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Fatalities statistics

Source: B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories



Hamas members parading in Gaza during the First Intifada: photo from Aljazeera website

March 5, 1988

Kissinger Urged Ban on TV Reports

By ROBERT D. McFADDEN

Henry A. Kissinger has privately urged that Israel bar television cameras and reporters from the occupied territories as part of its effort to put down violent protests.

Israel should accept the criticism of the press for doing so, according to Mr. Kissinger, and should suppress the Palestinian uprising as quickly as possible with whatever force is necessary to bring an end to a tragic situation.

He gave these views last month at an off-the-record breakfast in which he also urged prominent American Jews to refrain from criticizing Israel for its handling of the crisis. In addition, he expressed reservations about a peace conference and proposed that Israel unilaterally announce that it would give up some territory it seized in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

The remarks by Mr. Kissinger, who was Secretary of State in the Administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, were outlined in a confidential memorandum by Julius Berman, a former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and one of about eight people at the breakfast in early February. A copy of the memo was obtained by The New York Times.

Asked about the memo, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Berman expressed outrage yesterday that the remarks and the memo had been made public. Mr. Kissinger did not disavow the remarks, but insisted that his proposals for excluding news organizations were only a small part of what he had said.

In summarizing Mr. Kissinger's points, the memo said: "Israel should bar the media from entry into the territories involved in the present demonstrations, accept the short-term criticism of the world press for such conduct, and put down the insurrection as quickly as possible - overwhelmingly, brutally and rapidly." "Throw Out Television"

Paraphrasing Mr. Kissinger, the memo said: "The insurrection must be quelled immediately, and the first step should be to throw out television, a la South Africa. To be sure, there will be international criticism of the step, but it will dissipate in short order..."

Extract of a *New York Times* news article, published March 5th 1988. Henry Kissinger had previously been the US Secretary of State

PARALLEL HISTORIES

Were the Israelis justified in the use of force in the First Intifada?

Lines of Argument for NO

1. Palestinians had endured over 20 years of oppression by Israel, and were entitled to protest against an army illegally occupying their land.
2. Palestinian protests started peacefully and only became violent after the Israelis used force to disperse non-violent protests.
3. Ordinary Palestinians had no ways of expressing themselves politically; Israeli policies had exiled the PLO, sidelined other Arab Leaders, and suppressed local political organisation, so the only option left was protest on the street.
4. Since the Occupation started, Israel had taken measures to tie the Palestinian economy to the Israeli economy, which meant that Israel's economic problems were reflected and magnified in Palestine. Unemployment especially among young people was increasing, food was getting more expensive, and Palestinians had a right to protest their condition because it was of Israel's creation.
5. The use of force was unsuccessful in that it led to bad press for Israel, raised the status of the Palestinians, and brought the PLO back into the political picture after their exile in Tunis.



Protest march in 1987 by students and faculty of Birzeit University

Photo: Moshe Milner/Sygma

Protest march in 1987 by students and faculty of Birzeit University, in the West Bank



IDF soldiers beating Palestinian ambulance drivers during the Intifada, 1987.

Fatalities in the first Intifada

Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)

Year	Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	Of them: Minors under age 17	Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians	Of them: Minors under age 17
Dec 9-31 1987	22	5	0	0
1988	289	48	15	2
1989	285	78	17	5
1990	125	23	9	2
1991	91	24	6	3
1992	134	23	2	0
1993-13.9.93	124	36	5	1
14.9.93-31.12.93	30	4	8	0
1994	106	16	38	8
1995	42	4	2	1
1996	69	10	3	1
1997	18	5	4	0
1998	21	3	6	0
1999	8	0	0	0
2000 until 28.9	12	2	0	0
Total	1,376	281	115	23

Israelis killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)

Year	Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	Of them: Minors under age 17	Israeli security forces personnel killed by Palestinians
Dec 9-31 1987	0	0	0
1988	6	3	4
1989	3	0	6
1990	4	0	3
1991	7	0	1
1992	11	0	14
1993-13.9.93	16	0	15
14.9.93-31.12.93	11	0	3
1994	11	0	12
1995	7	0	9
1996	3	1	19
1997	4	0	0
1998	8	0	3
1999	1	0	2
2000 until 28.9	2	0	0
Total	94	4	91

Fatalities in the First Intifada. Source: B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

Palestinian Folk Poem- Quoted in S.Adwan, D.Bar-On and E.Naveh (eds.), *Side by Side: Parallel Histories of Israel-Palestine*

The 1967 War was over
All the land of Palestine was occupied
In every patch of land there was a tragedy
In every house a sad old man
In every village there was poverty
And in every camp an orphaned child!
They reckoned the case was over
And thought they had gotten rid of us
Once and for all!
They thought that after all the suffering
We had lost out patience
Or given up our steadfastness (*crucial word sumud in Arabic, self defined description of PLO policy*)
A million times did we tell them:
No to Camp David
A million NOs to it and to all those behind it
No to autonomy:
It is futile and deformed!
No to elections
They take our rights away
They replace our rules
And divide us more and more
Our demand is one:
An independent state
That only will last forever.

Palestinian leaders and representatives from across the West Bank and Gaza convened during the first month of the Intifada to formulate fourteen demands of the Israeli government. The demands were announced on January 14, 1988 by Professor Sari Nusseibeh at a press conference.

We call upon the Israeli authorities to comply with the following list of demands as a means to prepare the atmosphere for the convening of the suggested international peace conference, which conference will ensure a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, bringing about the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, peace and stability for the peoples of the region, and an end to violence and bloodshed:

1. To abide by the 4th Geneva Convention and all other international agreements pertaining to the protection of civilians, their properties and rights under a state of military occupation; to declare the Emergency Regulations of the British Mandate null and void, and to stop applying the iron fist policy;
2. The immediate compliance with the Security Council Resolutions 605 and 607, which call upon Israel to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Declaration of Human Rights; and which further call for the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
3. The release of all prisoners who were arrested during the recent uprising, and foremost among them our children. Also the rescinding of all proceedings and indictments against them;
4. The cancellation of the policy of expulsion, allowing all exiled Palestinians, including the four sent yesterday into exile, to return to their homes and families; also the release of all administrative detainees and the cancellation of the hundreds of house arrest orders. In this connection, special mention must be made of the several hundreds of applications for family reunions, which we call upon the authorities to accept forthwith;
5. The immediate lifting of the siege of all Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from all population centers.;

Extract from the Palestinians' Fourteen Demands, 1988

"There will be no development in the occupied territories instigated by the Israeli government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel."

Yitzhak Rabin in the Jerusalem Post 15 February 1985, Quoted in Y.Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, p.608

The New York Times

THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1990

NATIONAL THURSDAY, JULY 12, 1990

Israel Declines to Study Rabin Tie to Beatings

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, July 11 — Israel's Parliament decided today not to investigate charges that former Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered soldiers to break the bones of Arab militants at the beginning of the Palestinian uprising.

The house rejected a motion submitted by two Parliament members to set up a special commission to investigate whether Mr. Rabin had given soldiers orders to club, kick and hit arrested Palestinians as a form of punishment.

The proposal was prompted by testimony in recent courts-martial of several soldiers charged with beating Palestinians and breaking their bones. The soldiers have testified that they were simply following orders, and many Israelis have been saying they believe the men are being abandoned by the army's top commanders.

Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Mr. Rabin's successor, said he opposed the commission because he believed "the political echelon has to account to the Knesset and the voters only during the elections."

Mr. Rabin has steadfastly denied issuing "an illegal order or one which went against the decision of the Government." He did say, however, that soldiers were encouraged to subdu-

violent Palestinians with "the use of clubs while trying as much as possible to avoid using live ammunition" at the beginning of the uprising.


The debate over Mr. Rabin's role in the affair comes as the former defense minister is trying to wrest leadership of the Labor Party from his longtime rival, Shimon Peres.

A nationwide survey published in The Jerusalem Post today indicated that Mr. Rabin is more popular with Israelis than Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, Mr. Peres or any other senior politician.

'Israel Declines to Study Rabin Tie to Beatings,' *The New York Times* (July 12 1990)



The Madrid Peace Conference October 1991 – the first time Israeli and Palestinian representatives negotiated face-to-face



Flyer in the Palestinian Poster Project archive from 1992, protesting the closure of Birzeit University near Ramallah in the West Bank

Leaflets publicizing the intifada aims demanded the complete withdrawal of Israel from the territories it had occupied in 1967: the lifting of curfews and checkpoints; it appealed to Palestinians to join in civic resistance, while asking them not to employ arms, since military resistance would only invite devastating retaliation from Israel; it also called for the establishment of the Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, abandoning the standard rhetorical calls, still current at the time, for the "liberation" of all of Palestine.

Wikipedia article on The First Intifada quoting Walid Salem, 'Human Security from Below: Palestinian Citizens Protection Strategies, 1988–2005,' in Monica den Boer, Jaap de Wilde (eds.), The Viability of Human Security, Amsterdam University Press, 2008